determining the meaning of phenomenal concepts. Were common sense about consciousness relevant to content determination, then most mammals would have a strong case for determinate consciousness. Although we cannot inhabit their minds to subject them to first-person evaluation, we generally believe that there is something it is like to be a dog or a mouse or a bat or a cow.

Carruthers is not explicit about what first-personal evaluation requires. On one plausible interpretation, the first-personal evaluation of mental states involves introspectively attending to those states. If so, then states outside the reach of our higher order conceptual faculties most likely cannot be subjected to first-personal evaluation. Consequently, we must lack first-personal access to the states whose unconsciousness is integral to Carruthers' argument for the global workspace view. Our relation to our peripheral brain states may be like our relation to the brains of other animals. How can we justify trusting common sense about one but not the other?

Carruthers concludes that we're better off taking consciousness less seriously and attending instead to the messy details of our cognitive differences. While he may be right about this, the book may be read not as a eulogy for the philosophy of consciousness but as a prototype for a metasemantics-first research program. In this research program, theories of content determination are combined with empirical research into cognitive architecture to discern between physicalist theories of consciousness. Consciousness is not treated as a special property corresponding to a joint in nature, but merely as one of many possible states that we happen to care about. The book suggests that this program will reach an indeterminist conclusion about non-humans. While Carruthers makes a compelling case, many details remain to be filled in.

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Consequences of Reference Failure. BY MICHAEL MCKINSEY. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. (New York: Routledge, 2020. Pp. x + 155. Price £115.00.)

Michael McKinsey's *Consequences of Reference Failure* is about Direct Reference (DR) and empty names (i.e., names that don't refer).

Chapter 1 sketches some background. According to DR, a name's semantic content—what it contributes to propositions expressed by sentences containing it—is its referent. (McKinsey restricts DR to cases where names are used *as names* and allows for exceptions. I touch on these exceptions at the end but

ignore them for now.) According to DR, the semantic content of 'Socrates' is Socrates, and

(1) Socrates is wise.

expresses a proposition that can be represented as

(1p) <Socrates, *being wise*>.

If 'Santa' is an empty name, then according to DR 'Santa' has no semantic content. McKinsey argues that DR theorists should accept The No Proposition View (NP), on which sentences containing empty names don't express propositions. If 'Santa' is an empty name, then according to NP

(2) Santa is wise.

expresses no proposition. Since a sentence has a truth-value only if it expresses a proposition with that truth-value, (2) is neither true nor false.

In Chapter 2, McKinsey argues that some classical logical truths should go. He argues that, given NP, we should replace classical logic with a 'neutral free logic', which he calls 'NuFL'. NuFL is free (rather than classical) insofar as it permits interpretations with empty domains as well as interpretations that don't assign referents to some constants. And NuFL is neutral (rather than positive or negative) insofar as every atomic sentence containing a constant is neither true nor false on any interpretation that doesn't assign a referent to that constant. In NuFL, '*Fa*' is neither true nor false on an interpretation that doesn't assign any referent to '*a*', and so is

(3) $Fa \lor \sim Fa$.

(This fits with NP.) As a result, although (3) is a classical logical truth, it isn't a logical truth in NuFL. Similarly, although '$a = a$', '$\exists x(x = x)$', and '$a = b \rightarrow (Fa \rightarrow Fb)$' are classical logical truths, they aren't logical truths in NuFL.

In Chapter 3, McKinsey argues for a new class of aposteriori necessities (sentences or propositions that are true in every world but that can't be known apriori), distinct from Saul Kripke's 'water = H$_2$O' example. Some classical logical truths that aren't logical truths in NuFL are aposteriori necessities on interpretations on which their constants all refer. Although (3) isn't a logical truth in NuFL, it's true on every interpretation that assigns a referent to '*a*'. In McKinsey's modal extension of NuFL, MNFL, on any such interpretation (3) is necessary: it's true in every world. But it's aposteriori rather than apriori. To know that (3) is true, speakers would need to know that '*a*' refers, which isn't apriori. (Not all classical logical truths that aren't logical truths in NuFL are aposteriori necessities: '$a = a$' and '$\exists x(x = a)$' are aposteriori but, in MNFL, contingent.) Switching back to natural language, on McKinsey's view

(4) Either Socrates is wise or Socrates isn't wise.

expresses a proposition that's necessary but aposteriori: it's true in every world; but, to know it, speakers need to know that Socrates exists, which isn't apriori (except perhaps for Socrates).

McKinsey's case for aposteriori necessities rests on NP, which justifies the claim that *any* sentence containing a constant isn't a logical truth. An alternative to NP is The Gappy Proposition View (GP), on which (assuming 'Santa' is empty) (2) expresses a gappy proposition that can be represented as

(2p) <__, *being wise*>.

On Nathan Salmon's version of GP (from his 1998 paper "Nonexistence"), all gappy atomic propositions are neither true nor false. But it doesn't follow that *any* sentence containing an empty name is neither true nor false. On Salmon's view, if 'Santa' is empty, then

(5) Either Santa is wise or Santa isn't wise.

expresses a gappy non-atomic proposition that can be represented as

(5p) <OR, <__, *being wise*>, <NOT, <__, *being wise*>>>,

which is the disjunction of the gappy proposition represented as (2p) and its negation, the gappy proposition represented as

(NOT-2p) <NOT, <__, *being wise*>>.

Provided NOT is a suitable form of negation (*exclusion* negation, roughly equivalent to 'it's not the case that the following is a true proposition'), the proposition represented as (5p) is true when the proposition represented as (2p) is neither true nor false. Switching back to formal logic, (3) would be a logical truth, because on an interpretation on which '*Fa*' lacks a truth-value '∼*Fa*' is still true. And (3) might be necessary, as McKinsey argues, but perhaps it's apriori after all. Accepting Salmon's view might thus block the new class of aposteriori necessities. But, even if GP is true, some classical logical truths (e.g. '*a* = *a*' and '∃*x*(*x* = *a*)') would still need to go, as on McKinsey's view.

In Chapter 4, McKinsey argues against alternatives to NP, including David Braun's version of GP (from his 1993 paper "Empty Names"), on which all gappy atomic propositions are false (pp. 89–91). Although McKinsey doesn't argue directly against Salmon's version of GP, one of his arguments against Braun's version extends to Salmon's version.

> There can be no propositions that are 'gappy'. For a proposition is a way that the world can be said to be. But when we use a sentence containing an empty name . . . , there is *no* way that the world is said to be by our use of that sentence. And so there is nothing about the way the world is that could make our sentence either true or false. (p. 89, italics in original)

McKinsey might be right that there's nothing about the world that could make the gappy proposition represented as (2p) either true or false. But it doesn't follow that there's nothing about the world that could make the gappy proposition represented as (NOT-2p) either true or false. Perhaps what makes that proposition true is that whatever is represented as (2p) isn't a true proposition. (Compare: Socrates isn't a proposition and hence isn't a true proposition,

but the proposition that Socrates isn't a true proposition is a proposition, and it's true.)

Chapter 5 deserves much more attention than I can give it here. Briefly, in that chapter McKinsey argues that some sentences containing empty names are true when those names are used, not *as* names, but rather as short for reference-fixing descriptions. McKinsey restricts this claim to a narrow class of names (e.g. 'Vulcan', 'Holmes') in a narrow class of sentences (i.e., positive and negative existentials, metafictional and "metamythic" sentences, and "cognitive" sentences). In the case of 'Holmes', the reference-fixing description is rigidly non-referring (p. 131), so McKinsey's view isn't vulnerable to the sort of Kripkean modal argument that he uses against standard forms of descriptivism in Chapter 1. In the case of 'Vulcan', the reference-fixing description isn't rigidly non-referring (p. 124), but perhaps the class of sentences in which the name is short for the description is sufficiently narrow to avoid the modal argument.

I recommend *Consequences of Reference Failure* to anyone interested in DR or apparently empty names. It's an excellent book: clear, succinct, and tightly argued throughout.

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History, Metaphors, Fables. A Hans Blumenberg Reader. Edited, translated, and with an introduction BY HANNES BAJOHR, FLORIAN FUCHS, and JOE PAUL KROLL. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2020. Pp. 609. Price £24.99.)

Hans Blumenberg (1920–1996) has been widely admired in Europe for decades by academics and intellectuals from a wide variety of different fields and with varying interests. This has, not surprisingly, somewhat "diluted" his reputation. He was certainly a philosopher, influenced early on by Husserl and Heidegger (only early on, although their influence was still detectable later), but, possessed of vast erudition, and, to cite one of his main interests, constantly "curious" about a number of topics, he published on so many different topics, ranging from theories of modernity, the impact of Copernicus, the history of science more generally, that nature of literature, ontology, themes in the philosophy of language, theories of metaphor, histories and analyses of basic metaphors in Western thought, philosophical anthropology, the nature of myth and analyses of the meaning of numerous individual myths (especially the Prometheus myth), the role of technology in modernity, aesthetics, and individual studies