

Errata

March 2023

“E. E. Constance Jones on Existence in Fiction and Imagination” (2022)

p. 176: *The Principles of Mathematics* is from 1903; *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* is from 1919.

p. 177 n. 6: Jones’s view is close to James’s. On his view, each work of fiction is associated with a “world,” and there is a “separate and specific style of existence” associated either with each such world or with all “fictive,” “supernatural,” and “mythological” worlds taken together. See James 1889: 329, 329 n. 2.

“E. E. Constance Jones on Unique Existence” (2022)

p. 12: ‘§9, p. 84’ should be ‘§9, p. 83’.

p. 14: LINK is misstated. It should be ‘For any names n and n^* , any contexts c and c^* , any things x and x^* , and any existence attributes e and e^* , if n applies uniquely to x in c , n^* applies uniquely to x^* in c^* , e is the denomination of n in c , e^* is the denomination of n^* in c^* , and $e = e^*$, then $x = x^*$ ’. (That is, ‘the denomination of x in c ’ and ‘the denomination of x^* in c^* ’ should be ‘the denomination of n in c ’ and ‘the denomination of n^* in c^* ’, respectively.)

“Fregean Theories of Names from Fiction” (2021)

p. 385: ‘For the straightforward metafictional counterparts of (3) is’ should be ‘For the straightforward metafictional counterpart of (3) is’.

“The Extraordinary Impossibility of Sherlock Holmes” (2016)

p. 337 n. 4: ‘Benacerraf 1965, 5, 62, 67’ should be ‘Benacerraf 1965, 55, 62, 67’.

“Serial Fiction, Continued” (2014)

p. 70: McGonigal would not in fact “deny (A_3) as a matter of interpretation.” (There is a passage on p. 176 where McGonigal says that the relevant proposition is “not true” relative to the relevant circumstance; but there are also passages on p. 175 and p. 176 where McGonigal says that the relevant

proposition is “false” relative to the relevant circumstance, in which case *Hope* does contradict the original trilogy and (A₃) is true.)

“Against a Defense of Fictional Realism” (2014)

p. 211: ‘Attributed to Groucho Marx in *Duck Soup*’ should be ‘Groucho Marx in *Duck Soup*’.

p. 213: The title of Schnieder and von Solodkoff’s paper is ‘In Defence of Fictional Realism’, not ‘In Defense of Fictional Realism’. (The title is correct in p. 213 n. 9 but incorrect in the text.)

p. 221 n. 19: ‘Martinich, A.P. and Avrum, S.’ should be ‘Martinich, A.P. and Stroll, A.’.

“Benacerraf’s Revenge” (2013)

p. S119 n. 37: ‘the fact that (B) as an instance of’ should be ‘the fact that (B) is an instance of’.

“Never Been Kicked” (2011)

p. 151: In the movie, Marla Singer says some things after “I’ve got a stomach full of Xanax” before the narrator replies.

“Ontological Superpluralism” (2011)

p. 112: The first word in the original subtitle of “Function and Concept” is ‘*Vortrag*’.

“Parts of Singletons” (2010)

p. 504 n. 12: The right quotation marks should come immediately after ‘[i]ntuitively’. (The rest of the sentence should be an indirect quotation.)

p. 527: The definition of *immediately below* given in the text is incorrect. The correct definition is as follows: one level is immediately below another just in case the first level is lower than the second level and any level that is lower than the second level is either lower than, or identical to, the first level.

“On Sense and Direct Reference” (2006)

p. 7: ‘<George, the identity relation, <Cary, the identity relation, Cary>>’ should be ‘<George, the belief relation, <Cary, the identity relation, Cary>>’.

(The page numbering in the document is not the official page numbering.)

“Existence” (2006)

p. 372: The objection that *being instantiated* doesn’t seem to be “fundamental in the right sort of way” comes from Phillip Bricker, “McGinn on Non-Existent Objects and Reducing Modality,” *Philosophical Studies* 118.3 (April 2004): 439–451, at 440.

“Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects” (2005)

pp. 61–83: This paper rests on a mistake. See Caplan and Matheson 2006: 67–68.

“Creatures of Fiction, Myth, and Imagination” (2004)

p. 335 n. 11: I got the idea of using an analogy between authors and imaginers directly—rather than a chain of analogies, one between authors and myth-makers, another between myth-makers and imaginers—from Mark Barber.

“What’s Puzzling Gottlob Frege?” (2001)

p. 161 n. 5: ‘Dunnett’ should be ‘Dummett’.

p. 165: The first word in the original subtitle of “Function and Concept” is ‘*Vortrag*’.

p. 169 n. 19: ‘note 1’ should be ‘note 2’.

p. 199: ‘Section VI’ should be ‘Section V’.