



E. E. Constance Jones on unique existence

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Abstract

E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922) was one of the first women to study philosophy at the University of Cambridge. This paper focuses on her claim from her first major work, *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions* (published 1890), that each thing has a unique existence. Jones’s claim follows from claims about tropes and haecceities; but, I suggest, it’s not claims about tropes and haecceities that lead her to accept it. Rather, I suggest, it’s claims about what she calls the *denomination* of names and the *quantitiveness* of things that lead her to accept it. Her claim that each thing has a unique existence thus fits within her more general views in *Elements of Logic*.

Keywords E. E. Constance Jones · Existence · Ontological pluralism · Tropes · Haecceities

The *existence* of each thing is unique.

—Jones, *Elements of Logic*, 1890

1 Introduction

E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922) was one of the first women to study philosophy at the University of Cambridge.¹ Her work is little discussed today.² But it’s systematic and careful, and it deserves more attention than it has received, among other things for her contributions to the metaphysics of existence.

¹ For biographical overviews of Jones’s life, see Waithe and Cicero 1995: 25–27, Warnock 2004, Ostertag 2020: §1, Ostertag and Favia 2021: 328–329, Janssen-Lauret forthcoming. See also Jones 1922. For philosophical overviews of Jones’s work, see Waithe and Cicero 1995, Ostertag 2020.

² But, for some exceptions, see note 1.

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In this paper, I focus on Jones's claim from *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions* (published 1890) that each thing has a unique existence, which it doesn't share with anything else. Sections 2 and 3 are a bit of a crash course in some of her views, which are likely to be unfamiliar. In Section 2, I discuss some of her views about what she calls the *application* of names. In Section 3, I discuss a pair of distinctions that she makes: one between what she calls the *quantitiveness* and *qualitiveness* of things, the other between what she calls the *denomination* and *attribution* of names. In Section 4, I present her claim that each thing has a unique existence and situate it in relation to her *ontological pluralism*, according to which there are many different kinds of existence and, more generally, many different existence attributes. In Sections 5 and 6, I suggest that it's claims about quantitiveness and denomination that lead her to accept that each thing has a unique existence. And, in Section 7, I consider some claims about tropes and haecceities that entail that each thing has a unique existence. But, I suggest, it's not these claims that lead Jones to accept that each thing has a unique existence.

I should say at the outset that the main aim of this paper is historical, namely, to present and explain Jones's claim that each thing has a unique existence. But the paper also has some more systematic aims, namely, to explain how her claim fits within her more general views in *Elements of Logic* and to consider other packages of views that might lead one to accept it.

I should also say at the outset that, although I attribute the claim that each thing has a unique existence to Jones in *Elements of Logic*, I don't fully address the extent to which she accepts that claim in subsequent works. I suggest that the claim fits with her views about denomination and quantitiveness, but she doesn't explicitly talk about denomination and quantitiveness after *Elements of Logic*. (And, as far as I can tell, she doesn't simply replace the terms "denomination" and "quantitiveness" with new terms either.) Still, she might continue to accept the claim after *Elements of Logic*. In *An Introduction to General Logic* (published 1892), she talks about a thing's "unique individuality," which might be its unique existence. (See Section 4.2.) And, in "The Meaning of Sameness" (delivered 1901), she talks about a thing's "*individual or continuous existence*," which might also be its unique existence.³ (See Section 7.4.)

³ Italics in quotations from Jones occur in the original. I have made some changes in quotations, though. Spaces have been eliminated before colons, semi-colons, and question marks; after left (single or double) quotation marks; and before right (single or double) quotation marks. And single quotation marks have occasionally been added for direct speech reports or when an expression is mentioned rather than used.

Jones delivered "The Meaning of Sameness" to the Aristotelian Society on 25 March 1901 with "Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair. ... A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Boutwood, and others took part, written criticisms by Dr. Bosanquet, Dr. Lindsay, and Dr. G. E. Moore were read, and Miss Jones replied." See "Abstract of Minutes of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Twenty-Second Session," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s., 1 (1900–1901): 227–230, at p. 229.

2 Application

Let's start with some basic terminology. Jones uses "name" to apply to a wide range of expressions, among them proper names (e.g., "Muriel"), complex demonstratives (e.g., "this musician"), definite descriptions (e.g., "the father of Socrates"), bare nouns (e.g., "fairy"), simple and complex adjectival phrases (e.g., "fragrant," "true as steel"), and quantifier phrases (e.g., "some Welshman from Gower").⁴ She says, "*Name* may be defined as *any word or group of words applying to or indicating a Thing, or Things*" (§2, p. 5). She generally uses "applies to" for the relation between a name and the thing or things that it names.

Jones uses "term" for a name that occurs as a "Subject-name" *S* or a "Predicate-name" *P* in what she calls a "Categorical" sentence: that is, a sentence of the form *S copula P* (§2, p. 7; §6, p. 46; §7, p. 77; §11, p. 96). For example, in

(1) The red octavo volume on the chess-table is bound in Russia leather.

"The red octavo volume on the chess-table" is the subject-name, "is" is the copula, and "bound in Russia leather" is the predicate-name.⁵ "The red octavo volume on the chess-table" and "bound in Russia leather" are both terms in (1).

Jones divides things into what she calls "Subjects of Attributes" and "Attributes." She says, "The broadest division of Things that language involves and suggests is into I. Subjects of Attributes; II. Attributes" (§2, p. 12). For example, the red octavo volume on the chess-table is a subject of attributes, and *being bound in Russia leather* is an attribute.

Subjects of attributes are to be distinguished from subject-names. For example, the expression "The red octavo volume on the chess-table" is a subject-name in (1), and the volume itself is a subject of attributes. On its own, the term "subject" is ambiguous for Jones: sometimes she uses it to apply to subjects of attributes (e.g., §2, p. 11), and sometimes she uses it to apply to subject-names (e.g., §5, p. 39).

On Jones's view, every name applies to at least one thing. She says, "I can only conceive of the world as consisting of Subjects [of Attributes] (more or less permanent) and Attributes (more or less transient)"; and she adds, "No term, it appears to me, can be the name of anything other than some of these Subjects [of Attributes] or Attributes, and to some of these Subjects [of Attributes] or Attributes any term must apply" (§11, pp. 88–89). If every term applies to "some of these Subjects [of Attributes] or Attributes," then every term applies to at least one thing, as does every name, since every name can be used as a term.⁶ This goes for names like "man" and

⁴ The examples come from §2, p. 13, p. 14, p. 15, p. 18 (Table 3); §3, p. 25 (Table 5), p. 27 (Table 7); §6, p. 47. (Unless indicated otherwise, citations are to *Elements of Logic*.) Jones (1890) has an extensive typology of names. (See §2, p. 18 (Table 3).) By and large, I ignore her typology in the text.

⁵ Example (1) comes from Jones 1893b: 441.

⁶ On Jones's view, the same name can apply to different things in different contexts. (See below in the text.) I'm assuming that if a name applies to at least one thing whenever it's used as a term, then it applies to at least one thing.

“fairy” alike (§2, p. 14). On her view, “fairy” applies to fairies, which are things that have certain kinds of existence (§11, p. 90). (I say a bit more about the existence of fairies in Section 4.1.)

Jones discusses two forms of context-dependence. First, what a name applies to depends on who or what the speaker has in mind. “Gordon,” “Tom,” and “Muriel” are what she calls “Unique Names”: that is, “names of which the application may be said to be restricted to *one* object or group of objects” (§2, p. 14). She says,

Such names as *Gordon*, *Tom*, *Muriel*, of course may be, and are, applied to many individuals, but they may still be called Unique, being given in every case with the intention of distinguishing an unique individual. (§2, p. 15)

Although “Muriel” can apply to different people called “Muriel” in different contexts, its application in any given context (or “case”) is restricted to one person called “Muriel” who the speaker has in mind (or has “the intention of distinguishing”). For example, in a context in which the speaker has the tennis player Muriel Robb in mind, “Muriel” in

(2) Muriel is victorious.

applies only to Muriel Robb; whereas, in a context in which the speaker has the race car driver Muriel Thomson in mind, “Muriel” in (2) applies only to Muriel Thomson.⁷

Let’s say that a name applies *uniquely* to a thing in a context if and only if, in that context, that name applies to that thing and doesn’t apply to anything else. For example, in a context in which the speaker has Muriel Robb in mind, “Muriel” applies uniquely to Muriel Robb.

Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, what a predicate-name applies to in a sentence depends on what the subject-name applies to. Speaking of (1), Jones says,

In the sentence under discussion, *e.g.*, the Application of *bound in Russia leather*, is fixed and limited by the Application of the Subject[-name]; the Application of *bound in Russia leather*, in this proposition [sentence], is to *the octavo volume* pointed out by the Subject[-name], and to that only.⁸

In (1), “bound in Russia leather” applies uniquely to a red octavo volume. But, in

(3) The blue folio volume on the chess-table is bound in Russia leather.

“bound in Russia leather” applies uniquely to a different thing, namely, a blue folio volume.

⁷ Muriel Robb (1878–1907) won the Ladies’ All-Comers’ Singles at Wimbledon in 1902. (See Newman 2017.) Muriel Thomson (1875–1939) won the Ladies Bracelet Handicap at the Brooklands Automobile Racing Club in 1908. (See Beardwood 2008.)

⁸ Jones 1893b: 441. Jones uses “proposition” to apply to sentences (§6, p. 44). On the distinction between sentences and their contents (or “what is asserted”), see Jones 1911a: 14, 59–60, 70–71.

Putting these two forms of context-dependence together, the application of “victorious” in (2) depends on the application of “Muriel” in (2), which in turn depends on who the speaker has in mind. Supposing that the speaker has the tennis player Muriel Robb in mind, there’s no difference between (2) and

(4) Muriel is Muriel.

at the level of application: each sentence consists of a subject-name that applies uniquely to Muriel Robb, the copula “is,” and a predicate-name that applies uniquely to Muriel Robb. Still, on Jones’s view, (2) and (4) assert different things, and there’s an explanation of why (2) is significant in a way in which (4) isn’t.⁹

Jones isn’t offering a formal or compositional semantics, so she doesn’t address how to incorporate context-dependence into such a semantics. She says that we are entitled to assume that “the meaning and application of terms is uniform,” even if that assumption proves to be incorrect in a particular case (§2, p. 3). On her view, there’s an aspect of meaning other than application—what she calls *determination*—that might be more uniform (or less context-dependent) and perhaps could help in a formal or compositional semantics.¹⁰

3 Quantitiveness and qualitiveness, denomination and attribution

Jones distinguishes a thing’s *quantitiveness* and *qualitiveness*. She introduces the terms “quantitiveness” and “qualitiveness” in the following passage.

By thing I mean whatever has Existence and Character. Existence and Character have a certain correspondence with ‘Quantity’ and ‘Quality’ as sometimes used; but since Quantity, Quality, and their derivatives have in ordinary logical use also narrower and somewhat different meanings, I should propose to use Quantitiveness and Qualitiveness (with the corresponding adverbs and adjectives). (§2, pp. 5–6)

⁹ On Jones’s view, (2) and (4) both assert something about *denomination*: (2) asserts that “Muriel” and “victorious” in (2) have the same denomination, whereas (4) asserts that “Muriel” and “Muriel” in (4) have the same denomination (§6, p. 46). (On denomination, see Section 3.) The significance of (2) is explained in part by the difference in *determination* between “Muriel” and “victorious” in (2)—where the determination of “Muriel” is one or more attributes that are “*explicitly signified*” by the name, including *being called by that name* (§2, p. 8). This, I take it, is what Jones means when she says that a sentence like (2) “asserts Identity of Denomination in Diversity of Determination” (§6, p. 46). (See also p. ix; §6, p. 48; §11, p. 96; §15, p. 127, p. 128.)

¹⁰ On determination, see note 9. But Jones says that names that have the same determination have the same denomination (§6, p. 51); and names that have the same denomination have the same application (see Section 6.3). So, if application varies across contexts, so does determination. But perhaps her claim that sameness of determination makes for sameness of denomination could be modified to take context-dependence into account. Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion here.

Here, Jones says that, although the familiar terms “Quantity” and “Quality” are sometimes used for what she calls “Existence” and “Character,” she’s introducing new terms—namely, “Quantitiveness” and “Qualitiveness”—for them.

On Jones’s view, a thing’s quantitiveness is existence—or, more carefully (since there are many different existence attributes), an existence attribute. (In Section 5, I return to the question of what existence attribute a thing’s quantitiveness might be.) And a thing’s qualitiveness is all of its attributes. Jones says, “The Qualitiveness of a Thing includes *all* its attributes” (§2, p. 7). For example, George Eliot’s quantitiveness is an existence attribute that she has, and her qualitiveness is all of her attributes.¹¹

Jones also distinguishes a name’s *denomination* and *attribution*. She introduces the terms “denomination” and “attribution” in the following passage.

I propose to use the word Denomination (of a Name or Term) as corresponding to *Quantitiveness* (of a Thing); and *Attribution* (of a Name or Term) as corresponding to *Qualitiveness* (of a Thing). ‘Denomination’ of a Name or Term will therefore refer to the continued identical existence of the things, whether Subjects [of Attributes] or Attributes, which are indicated; and ‘Attribution’ of a Name or Term will mean the distinctive character of the things named. (§2, p. 8)

Setting aside names that apply to more than one thing, the attribution of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is that thing’s qualitiveness.¹² And a thing’s qualitiveness is all of its attributes. So the attribution of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is all of that thing’s attributes. For example, the attribution of “George Eliot,” the name, is the qualitiveness of George Eliot, the person (or thing): that is, all of her attributes, what Jones would describe as George Eliot’s “distinctive character.”

Again setting aside names that apply to more than one thing, the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is that thing’s quantitiveness.¹³ And a thing’s quantitiveness is an existence attribute that it has. So the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is an existence attribute that that thing has. Jones later speaks of “Denomination, corresponding to the *existence* of the thing named” (§27, pp. 196–197). For example, the denomination of “George Eliot,” the name, is the quantitiveness of George Eliot, the person (or thing): that is, an existence attribute that she has, what Jones would describe as George Eliot’s “continued identical existence.”

A terminological warning: denomination isn’t denotation. Although Jones uses the term “denotation” in later works, she generally doesn’t in *Elements of Logic*.¹⁴

¹¹ Jones mentions “George Eliot” and Eliot’s 1862–1863 novel *Romola* (§3, p. 31 (Table 11); §11, p. 99).

¹² On setting aside names that apply to more than one thing, see notes 13 and 61.

¹³ On Jones’s view, the denomination of a name that applies to more than one thing is “the continued identical existence” of several things. I ignore this aspect of her view in the text. See note 61.

¹⁴ In *An Introduction to General Logic*, Jones (1892a: 269) includes “denotation” in the “Index and Vocabulary” but doesn’t use it in the text. Starting in 1893, she generally uses “denotation” and takes it to be equivalent to “application” or “extension.” See Jones 1893a: 219; 1893b: 452, 453 n. 1.

After distinguishing denomination and attribution (and also two parts of attribution: namely, *determination* and *implication*), she says,

I have avoided the words ‘Denotation’ and ‘Connotation’, because they have, as Fowler says, been ‘already employed with so much uncertainty’ that it is difficult to use them without some risk of confusion; and indeed no use of those terms that I am acquainted with corresponds to the distinction which I have in view here.¹⁵ (§2, p. 8 n. 2)

When she does use or mention “denotation” in *Elements of Logic*, she takes it to be equivalent to “application” or “extension” (§11, p. 91; §21, p. 159).¹⁶ For example, the *denotation* (or application or extension) of “George Eliot” is George Eliot. By contrast, the *denomination* of “George Eliot” is George Eliot’s quantitiveness: that is, an existence attribute that she has. So, unless George Eliot is identical to her quantitiveness, the denomination of “George Eliot” is distinct from its denotation.¹⁷

4 Universality of unique existence

4.1 Ontological pluralism

According to *ontological pluralism*, there are different ways of being or kinds of existence.¹⁸ Jones developed an original version of ontological pluralism over the course of her career, starting with *Elements of Logic*.

On Jones’s view, there are many “different kinds of existence” (§11, p. 101). One is “physical existence,” which is had by King’s College Chapel, Cambridge but not by fairies (§11, p. 89).¹⁹ Another is “*existence in imagination*,” which is had by fairies but perhaps not by King’s College Chapel (§11, p. 90).²⁰ A third is existence in what she calls a “Region of Supposition,” which is had by round-squares.²¹

On Jones’s view, kinds of existence are attributes.²² She describes a kind (or “mode”) of existence as a “characteristic” (§11, p. 90); and attributes are characteristics (§2, p. 12). In addition, she endorses John Venn’s (1889: 198) claim in *The*

¹⁵ *Determination* is attribution that’s “explicitly signified”; *implication* is attribution that isn’t explicitly signified (§2, p. 8). On determination, see notes 9 and 10. The quotation is from Fowler 1887: 19 n. 1.

¹⁶ This is how Jones later uses “denotation.” (See note 14. See also Jones 1911a: 12, 71.) And see §10, p. 85 and §27, p. 199, where Jones uses “denoted” to talk about the things named by a name: that is, the things that a name applies to.

¹⁷ For a contrary interpretation, see Jourdain 1911–1912: 263 n. *, Thiel 1968: 116 n. 9, Waithe and Cicero 1995: 32–33.

Jourdain (1911–1912: 219) lists his address on 10 November 1911 as “The Lodge, Girton, Cambridge.” Jones was then Mistress of Girton College. See Jones 1922: 68.

¹⁸ See, for example, Turner 2010, McDaniel 2017. The term “ontological pluralism” comes from Turner 2010: 5.

¹⁹ The example of King’s College Chapel comes from §6, pp. 45–46.

²⁰ See Caplan forthcoming.

²¹ Jones 1893b: 455. See also Jones 1911a: 61.

²² Thanks to Sam Proctor here.

Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic that “existence, in every case where it need be taken into account, can be regarded as being *of the nature of an attribute*” (§11, p. 90 n. 1; Jones’s italics). Kinds of existence are thus among a group of existence attributes. This group is something like the colors and the virtues, which Jones describes as “groups of Attributes which have such striking similarity that they possess a name in common” (§2, p. 11).

On Jones’s view, in addition to specific kinds of existence (like physical existence, existence in imagination, and existence in a region of supposition), there’s “*existence itself*” or “*existence pure and simple*,” which is had by King’s College Chapel, fairies, and round-squares alike (§11, p. 88, p. 90). Indeed, it’s an attribute that everything has. This attribute is *generic existence*.²³

Suppose that George Eliot has an existence attribute that she doesn’t share with anything else. Let’s call this her *unique existence*. Consider the following claim.

Universality of Unique Existence: Each thing has a unique existence.

I take Jones to be endorsing Universality of Unique Existence when she says, “The *existence* of each thing is unique” (§2, p. 10). (I discuss some exegetical complications below in Section 4.2.) And I take it that a thing’s unique existence is among the existence attributes, a group that includes both generic existence and specific kinds of existence.²⁴

Few accept Universality of Unique Existence. In fact, Jones might be unique in this regard.²⁵ Terence Parsons (1980: 10) reports often hearing “in conversation ... that ‘everything has its own special mode of existence.’” (I haven’t heard this in conversation.) But none of the existence attributes that Parsons (1980: 10–11) goes on to mention—for example, “Pegasus *exists in mythology*, Sherlock Holmes *exists in fiction*”—is anything’s unique existence. (Existence in mythology is presumably shared by many things; so, too, for existence in fiction.)

4.2 “The *existence* of each thing is unique”

Jones’s remark that “The *existence* of each thing is unique” occurs in the following passage.

²³ I borrow the term “generic existence” from Merricks 2019: 598.

²⁴ I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helping me see that Universality of Unique Existence is weaker than the claim that each thing has a unique *kind* of existence. (It might be that each thing has a unique existence, even if it’s not the case that each thing’s unique existence is a distinct kind of existence—just as it might be that each thing has a unique location, even if it’s not the case that different things have different kinds of location.) I am sympathetic to an interpretation on which Jones accepts the stronger claim, too; but I don’t argue for that interpretation here. Speaking of a thing, Jones talks about “the *kind* of its Quantitiveness” (§2, p. 7); and, as discussed below in Section 5, quantitiveness might be unique existence. Still, even if there are different kinds of quantitiveness, it might not be that each thing has its own kind of quantitiveness.

²⁵ Bacon (2008) and McDaniel (2017) might be sympathetic to Universality of Unique Existence. See Sections 7.1 and 7.3.

(*)Existence and Character (Quantitiveness and Qualitiveness) are, of course, inseparably bound up together, though we may think and speak of them separately. The *existence* of each thing is unique, but this uniqueness of existence can only be made clear by its unique *attribution*—and the existence and the attribution involve each other. (§2, p. 10)

Strictly speaking, attribution belongs to a name rather than to a thing named, although in the starred passage Jones seems to be speaking of the attribution of the thing itself. Since the attribution of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is all of that thing's attributes, I take it that she means to be talking about all of the attributes of the thing in question. In the starred passage, then, she's saying that existence and all of a thing's attributes are "inseparably bound up together" and that a thing's unique existence "can only be made clear" by its unique collection of attributes.

Jones might be read here merely as endorsing a version of the identity of indiscernibles: no two things have exactly the same attributes. When she says "The *existence* of each thing is unique," perhaps all she means is that each thing's qualitiveness is unique, since a thing's unique existence "can only be made clear" by its unique qualitiveness.

But we can also read Jones as saying that it's precisely because each thing has a unique existence that each thing has a unique qualitiveness. Since a thing's unique existence is among its attributes, things that have different unique existences differ in their attributes and hence in their qualitiveness. A thing's qualitiveness includes its existence attributes.²⁶ Jones mentions "unique individuality" as one of the attributes of a thing that a name applies to (§2, p. 14, p. 15).²⁷ And it might be that the "unique individuality" of a thing is its unique existence. If a thing's qualitiveness (or character) includes its unique existence, that would be a way in which existence and character are "inseparably bound up together" or in which "the existence and the attribution involve each other," as she puts it in the starred passage.²⁸

4.3 Some consequences

On Jones's view, attributes are things (§2, p. 12). For example, *being a novelist* is a thing. If Universality of Unique Existence is a claim about all things, including all attributes, then by Universality of Unique Existence *being a novelist* has a unique existence, too. Jones doesn't say that each attribute has a unique existence. But she does talk about attributes having attributes, including existence attributes (§2, p. 13; §11, p. 88).

²⁶ Among the existence attributes in a thing's qualitiveness are the kinds of existence that it has. Jones speaks of "the qualitiveness of the thing—including in qualitiveness the *kind* of its existence (material, fictitious, ideational, etc.)" (§2, p. 9). (But here she speaks of a thing as having just one kind of existence. She speaks of "the *kind* of its existence" rather than of the kinds of existence that it has.)

²⁷ See also Jones 1892a: §2, p. 7; §17, pp. 163–164.

²⁸ See also §2, p. 8, where Jones says that "quantitiveness and qualitiveness" are "mutually implicated." But she also says that "lines and angles" and "likeness and difference" are mutually implicated, and in those cases, the mutual implication isn't that some of the things are among the others.

On Jones's view, George Eliot's unique existence is an attribute. So, if each attribute has a unique existence, then George Eliot's unique existence has a unique existence, too. Jones doesn't say that each unique existence has a unique existence. But she does talk about existence attributes having existence attributes. Speaking of a predicate-name P in a categorical sentence, she says,

It is not existence pure and simple which is ever asserted in the P of any proposition [sentence], but only some *mode* of existence, that is, some characteristic; the bare "existence" of which, of course, depends upon the "existence" of that of which it is the characteristic. (§11, p. 90)

Here "the bare 'existence'" of "some *mode* of existence" that isn't "existence pure and simple" might be the generic existence of an existence attribute other than generic existence. If existence attributes can have existence attributes, then perhaps a unique existence can have a unique existence, too.

5 The path from quantitiveness

Universality of Unique Existence is a consequence of the following two claims.

Quantitiveness: Each thing has quantitiveness.

Quantitiveness is Unique Existence: A thing's quantitiveness is its unique existence.

If each thing has quantitiveness, and its quantitiveness is its unique existence, then each thing has a unique existence, in which case Universality of Unique Existence is true.

Jones accepts Quantitiveness. In a passage quoted above in Section 3, she takes each thing to have existence ("By *thing* I mean whatever has Existence and Character"), and she introduces 'quantitiveness' as a term for that existence (§2, pp. 5–6). As she puts it in the detailed Table of Contents, "A *Thing* is whatever has Existence (Quantitiveness) and Character (Qualitiveness)" (p. vii).²⁹

The textual evidence for Quantitiveness is Unique Existence is somewhat equivocal. On the one hand, there are passages in which Jones seems to be thinking of a thing's quantitiveness as generic existence, contrary to Quantitiveness is Unique Existence. For example, she says,

By *Quantitiveness* I mean that in virtue of which anything is *something*, that which is involved in calling it *something* or *anything*—*just the bare minimum of existence of some kind* which justifies the application of a name (that is, of

²⁹ Quantitiveness turns out to be true by stipulation, given what Jones means by "thing" and how she introduces "quantitiveness." (I owe this observation to an anonymous referee.) But I don't think it's true by stipulation that the world is composed of things thus understood or that a thing's quantitiveness is its unique existence.

any name at all). To attribute *Quantitiveness* to anything would be simply to say *that it is*. (§2, p. 6)

Here, the “*bare minimum of existence of some kind*” might be generic existence, and simply to say that a thing is might be to attribute generic existence to it.

Jones also says,

In as far as a term is *denominative*, it applies (as I understand *denominative*) to the quantitiveness, the mere undetermined existence, of the thing of which it is the name—that identity which enables us to speak of a thing as *one*, under whatever change of attributes.³⁰ (§2, pp. 8–9)

Here, “mere undetermined existence” might also be generic existence.

But, on the other hand, there are passages (sometimes the same ones) in which Jones seems to accept Quantitiveness is Unique Existence. For example, in the passage just quoted above, she describes a thing’s quantitiveness as “that identity which enables us to speak of a thing as *one*” (§2, p. 9). Here, “that identity which enables us to speak of a thing as *one*” might be its unique existence.

And, speaking of a categorical sentence *S is P*, Jones says,

If my *S* is the name of something having its own quantitiveness, the *P* which I assert that *S* is must certainly have the same quantitiveness, and therefore be the same *thing* (subject [of attributes] or attribute, as the case may be) as *S*, and have the same denomination as *S*. (§6, p. 51)

In this passage, “*S*” and “*P*” are sometimes mentioned and sometimes used schematically. To make things clearer, let’s consider.

(5) George Eliot is Mary Ann Evans.

where “George Eliot” is the subject-name *S* and “Mary Ann Evans” is the predicate-name *P*.³¹

If ‘George Eliot’ is the name of something having its own quantitiveness, the Mary Ann Evans which I assert that George Eliot is must certainly have the same quantitiveness, and therefore be the same *thing* (subject [of attributes] or attribute, as the case may be) as George Eliot, and [‘Mary Ann Evans’ must] have the same denomination as ‘George Eliot’.

Here, “something having its own quantitiveness” might be something having its own unique existence. And, from the claim that two things have “the same quantitiveness,” Jones infers that those things are “the same *thing*.” This inference is valid

³⁰ What Jones says here isn’t entirely correct. Assuming that a thing is distinct from its quantitiveness, a term applies to “the thing of which it is the name” rather than to “the quantitiveness, the mere undetermined existence,” of that thing. (If a thing were identical to its quantitiveness, then quantitiveness couldn’t be generic existence, at least not if there’s more than one thing.)

³¹ Example (5) comes from Jones 1893b: 447.

if Quantitiveness is Unique Existence is true but not if quantitiveness is generic existence.

In addition, Jones sometimes talks about things being “quantitively identical” or “quantitively distinct” (§9, p. 84; §25, p. 176).³² She uses the terms “numerical identity” and “numerical distinctness” in later works.³³ In *Elements of Logic*, she doesn’t use those terms herself but attributes them to W. Stanley Jevons (1879).³⁴ Two things are quantitatively identical (in her terms) if and only if they’re numerically identical or numerically the same (in the terms that she attributes to Jevons). She criticizes Jevons (1879: 17–19), who advances a principle that he calls “The Substitution of Similar,” for “the ever-recurring confusion ... between quantitative identity (what Jevons would perhaps call numerical sameness or identity) and qualitative likeness” (§21, pp. 158–159). And she says,

The meaning to which I should wish to restrict *Identity*, and the meaning which the whole theory of Identity seems to me to require, is what I should call *quantitive* (not qualitative) *sameness*—what Jevons would perhaps call *numerical sameness*—the sameness that I mean when I say, ‘This pencil is the *identical* pencil which I lost last week’. (§25, p. 178 n. 1)

If two things are quantitatively identical if and only if they’re numerically identical, then two things have the same quantitiveness if and only if they’re numerically identical. And this claim is true if Quantitiveness is Unique Existence is true but not if quantitiveness is generic existence.

So there’s some reason to think that Jones accepts Quantitiveness is Unique Existence.³⁵ And, if she accepts that claim and Quantitiveness, then it might be those claims that lead her to accept Universality of Unique Existence.

6 The path from denomination

6.1 From denomination to Universality of Unique Existence

Universality of Unique Existence is a consequence of the following two claims.

Name: For any thing x , there’s a name n and a context c such that n applies uniquely to x in c .

Denomination is Unique Existence: For any thing x , name n , and context c , if n applies uniquely to x in c , then the denomination of n in c is x ’s unique existence.

A little less precisely (ignoring the relativization to context), Name is the claim that, for each thing, there’s a name that applies uniquely to it; and Denomination is

³² See also §2, p. 5; §6, p. 46.

³³ See, for example, Jones 1892a: §19, p. 211; 1892b: 278 (a review of Hillebrand 1891). And see Jones 1908.

³⁴ Jevons (1879: 19, 28) uses the terms “numerically distinct” and “numerically different.”

³⁵ A further reason is mentioned in Section 6.4.

Unique Existence is the claim that the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is that thing's unique existence. By Name, there's a name, n_1 , that applies uniquely to George Eliot. By Denomination is Unique Existence, the denomination of n_1 is George Eliot's unique existence. So there's a thing—namely, the denomination of n_1 —that is George Eliot's unique existence. Generalizing from George Eliot, it follows that for each thing there's a thing—namely, the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to it—that is its unique existence, in which case Universality of Unique Existence is true.

There's a passage in which Jones seems to be thinking of the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing (in this case, an attribute rather than a subject of attributes) as generic existence, contrary to Denomination is Unique Existence. On her view, "triangularity" is a name that applies uniquely to an attribute, triangularity. She says, "Denomination of *Triangularity* is the mere existence of the attribute named wherever it occurs" (§2, p. 10). Here, "mere existence" might be generic existence. But, still, I argue in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 that there are reasons for thinking that Jones accepts Denomination is Unique Existence.

6.2 Categorical sentences

One reason for thinking that Jones accepts Denomination is Unique Existence is that it's consistent with what she says about "affirmative Categorical" sentences: that is, sentences of the form S is P (§2, p. 14). On her view, an affirmative categorical sentence asserts "Identity of Denomination" (§6, p. 46).³⁶

Given Jones's account of categorical sentences, the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing can't be generic existence in every case. If the denomination of "George Eliot" is generic existence and the denomination of "Shakespeare" is also generic existence, then "George Eliot" and "Shakespeare" would have the same denomination. And, since

(6) George Eliot is Shakespeare.

asserts that "George Eliot" and "Shakespeare" have the same denomination, (6) would be true. But (6) is false.

³⁶ On Jones's view, a *significant* affirmative categorical sentence asserts "Identity of Denomination in Diversity of Determination" (§6, p. 46). I take it that, on her view, diversity of determination is part of what explains the significance of the sentence, not part of what it asserts. See note 9.

After *Elements of Logic*, Jones adopts an account on which significant affirmative categorical sentences assert "Identity of Application in Diversity of Signification" or "Identity of Denotation in Diversity of Intension." (See Jones 1892a: §19, p. 210; 1911a: 1.) She takes this later account to be the same as Frege's (1892) and criticizes Russell's (1905) account. (See Jones 1911a: 12, 46–48.) Much more would need to be said about Jones's view in relation to Frege's and Russell's, and why she continues to treat predicative and quantificational sentences as having the form S copula P . (For more on Jones in relation to Frege and Russell, see Waithe and Cicero 1995: 36–45; Ostertag 2020: §§3–6, [forthcoming](#); Janssen-Lauret [forthcoming](#).) Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion here.

However, we can't similarly argue against Denomination is Unique Existence. "George Eliot" applies uniquely to George Eliot, and "Shakespeare" applies uniquely to Shakespeare. So, by Denomination is Unique Existence, the denomination of "George Eliot" is George Eliot's unique existence, and the denomination of "Shakespeare" is Shakespeare's unique existence. Since their unique existences are distinct, "George Eliot" and "Shakespeare" wouldn't have the same denomination. So, if (6) asserts that "George Eliot" and "Shakespeare" have the same denomination, then (6) would be false, as desired.

6.3 Link

Another reason for thinking that Jones accepts Denomination is Unique Existence is that it's consistent with what she says about the denomination and application of names. On her view, names that have the same denomination have the same application. A bit more precisely, she accepts something like the following claim.

Link: For any names n and n^* , any contexts c and c^* , any things x and x^* , and any existence attributes e and e^* , if n applies uniquely to x in c , n^* applies uniquely to x^* in c^* , e is the denomination of x in c , e^* is the denomination of x^* in c^* , and $e = e^*$, then $x = x^*$.

For example, speaking of

(7) This musician is a painter.

where "This musician" is the subject-name S and "a painter" is the predicate-name P , she says, "the denomination of S is the denomination of P ; hence S and P apply to one and the same person" (§6, pp. 47–48).³⁷

If names that have the same denomination have the same application, and what a name applies to varies across contexts, then the denomination of a name also varies across contexts.³⁸ Consider the denomination of "bound in Russia leather" in

(1) The red octavo volume on the chess-table is bound in Russia leather.

and

(3) The blue folio volume on the chess-table is bound in Russia leather.

³⁷ See also §27, p. 200. In the case of names that apply to more than one thing, see §15, p. 128 n. 1; §27, p. 199, p. 205.

³⁸ Thanks to Jared Wright here.

If “bound in Russia leather” has the same denomination in (1) and (3), then by Link it has the same application in (1) and (3). But it doesn’t: it applies uniquely to the red octavo volume in (1), and it applies uniquely to the blue folio volume in (3).³⁹

Jones sometimes explicitly relativizes the denomination of a name to the context (in the case of a name that applies to more than one thing). She discusses

(8) All birds are animals.

which she takes to be equivalent to.

(9) All birds are [some] animals.⁴⁰

She says,

what is asserted is that the denomination of *All birds* is the very same as the denomination of *animals*. But not of *all* animals, but only of ... some *animals*. The denomination of *All birds* is found to coincide with, to *be* in short, the denomination of the *some animals* of the proposition [sentence] under consideration. (§6, p. 47)

Here, she doesn’t say that (9) asserts that “All birds” and “[some] animals” have the same denomination *tout court*. Rather, she says that (9) asserts that the denomination of “All birds” is the same as the denomination of “[some] animals” in the sentence “under consideration”: that is, in (9).

Given Link, the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing can’t be generic existence in every case. If the denomination of “George Eliot” is generic existence and the denomination of “Shakespeare” is also generic existence, then “George Eliot” and “Shakespeare” would have the same denomination. So, by Link, “George Eliot” and “Shakespeare” would apply uniquely to the same person. But they don’t.

However, we can’t similarly argue against Denomination is Unique Existence. Denomination is Unique Existence doesn’t entail that “George Eliot” and “Shakespeare” have the same denomination. So Link wouldn’t entail that “George Eliot” and “Shakespeare” apply uniquely to the same person.

³⁹ Given Denomination is Unique Existence and the context-dependence of “bound in Russia leather,” the denomination of “bound in Russia leather” also varies across contexts: it’s the red octavo volume’s unique existence in (1) and the blue folio volume’s unique existence in (3). Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion here.

⁴⁰ Jones uses “[some] animals,” with the square brackets, to talk about the predicate-name in (8) (§6, p. 47). On her view, (8), (9), and “Some animals are all birds” are equivalent. See Ostertag 2020: §2.4, forthcoming.

6.4 Name

In a later work, Jones suggests that there's at least one thing that can't be named at all, in which case, contrary to Name, there wouldn't be a name that applies uniquely to it. She considers the "aggregate" of all things and asks, "*How* is such an Aggregate defined or known?"⁴¹ One possibility is that the aggregate is defined by the names in our language. But, against this possibility, she says, "it might plausibly be maintained that the aggregate so determined is arbitrarily and unwarrantably limited—that Thought (not to mention 'Reality') may transcend all current (and even all possible) Language."⁴²

It might be surprising if on Jones's view some things couldn't be named. On her view, the world consists of attributes and subjects of attributes (§11, p. 88), and attributes and subjects of attributes are things (§2, p. 12). So it seems that "thing" is a name that applies to everything in the world.

It might also be surprising if on Jones's view we could think of something but, contrary to Name, didn't have a name that applies uniquely to it in some context. On her view, what a name like "Muriel" uniquely applies to depends on who the speaker has "the intention of distinguishing" (§2, p. 15). If we can think of a thing, then we can intend to distinguish it, in which case there might be a name like "Muriel" or "that thing" that would apply uniquely to it in that context.

Without Name, we can't directly infer Universality of Unique Existence from Denomination is Unique Existence. But we can still directly infer the weaker claim that each thing that some name uniquely applies to has a unique existence. And this weaker claim still implies that George Eliot, for example, has a unique existence.⁴³

And, without Name, there might still be a way to infer Universality of Unique Existence. By Denomination is Unique Existence, each thing that some name uniquely applies to has a unique existence, which is the denomination of that name. And the denomination of that name is the quantitiveness of that thing (§2, p. 8). So the quantitiveness of each thing that some name uniquely applies to is its unique existence. And, by Quantitiveness, each thing has quantitiveness. So what is the quantitiveness of a thing that no name uniquely applies to? One hypothesis is that such a thing's quantitiveness is generic existence. But another hypothesis, one that might be simpler and less ad hoc, is that such a thing's quantitiveness, like the quantitiveness of each thing that some name uniquely applies to, is its unique existence. In that case, Quantitiveness is Unique Existence is true. And Universality of Unique Existence follows from Quantitiveness and Quantitiveness is Unique Existence.

⁴¹ Jones 1893a: 222.

⁴² Jones 1893a: 222.

⁴³ I owe the observations in this paragraph to Eileen Nutting.

7 Tropes and haecceities

7.1 The path from tropes

There are various paths that lead to Universality of Unique Existence. One path relies on a claim about *tropes*. A trope is an attribute that's a particular rather than a universal.⁴⁴ No two things have the same trope. For example, if George Eliot's pallor and Shakespeare's pallor are tropes, then their pallors are numerically distinct even if they're exactly similar.

Universality of Unique Existence is a consequence of the following two claims.

Existence: Each thing has an existence attribute.

Tropes: Attributes are tropes.

By Existence, George Eliot has an existence attribute, *e*. By Tropes, *e* is a trope. Since no two things have the same trope, nothing else has *e*. So there's an existence attribute—namely, *e*—that only George Eliot has. Generalizing from George Eliot, it follows that for each thing there's an existence attribute—namely, an existence trope—that only it has, in which case Universality of Unique Existence is true.

John Bacon (2008) is a trope theorist who might be sympathetic to something like Universality of Unique Existence. On a view that he considers, “individuals”—that is, subjects of attributes—are bundles of tropes, each bundle contains a “kernel,” and different bundles contain different “kernels.”⁴⁵ He suggests that the “kernel” in each bundle is a trope that is “the existence of the individual that has lent its kernel.”⁴⁶ On this view, each subject of attributes has a kernel that's an existence trope. In that case, the following claim is true.

Individual Unique Existence: Each subject of attributes has a unique existence.

Individual Unique Existence is a consequence of Tropes and the following claim.

Individual Existence: Each subject of attributes has an existence attribute.

Individual Unique Existence and Individual Existence are Universality of Unique Existence and Existence restricted to subjects of attributes.

But Universality of Unique Existence might be false even if Individual Unique Existence is true. On Jones's view, some things—namely, attributes—aren't subjects of attributes. If some attribute doesn't have a unique existence, then Universality of Unique Existence would be false. In particular, if tropes are things that aren't

⁴⁴ On the view that attributes are particulars, see, for example, Stout 1902–1903, 1921, 1923. The term “trope” comes from Williams 1953a: 7. See also Williams 1953b.

⁴⁵ Bacon 2008: §11.

⁴⁶ Bacon 2008: §11. For a different view of existence, see Bacon 1995: 24.

themselves bundles that contain existence tropes, then Universality of Unique Existence might be false, even if Individual Unique Existence is true.

7.2 Jones on tropes

Universality of Unique Existence follows from Existence and Tropes. Jones accepts Existence. She takes each thing to have existence (§2, pp. 5–6); and, as discussed in Section 4.1, on her view existence is to be understood as an attribute. The question, then, is whether she accepts Tropes.

In her autobiography, Jones (1922: 71–72) endorses G. F. Stout’s (1921) work.⁴⁷ And Stout accepts Tropes, or something like it.⁴⁸ Jones (1893b) seems sympathetic to Tropes in “On the Nature of Logical Judgment,” where she discusses

(10) The color of the Pacific Ocean = the color of the Atlantic Ocean.

and

(11) Deal = the landing-place of Caesar.⁴⁹

On her view, the color of the Pacific Ocean isn’t numerically identical to the color of the Atlantic Ocean. She says, “*The colour of the Pacific Ocean may be exactly like that of the Atlantic, but we certainly cannot say that the one is the other in the sense in which we can say that Deal is the place where Cæsar landed—or indeed in any sense at all.*”⁵⁰ If the color of the Pacific Ocean and the color of the Atlantic Ocean are numerically distinct despite being exactly similar, then those colors are tropes.

But it doesn’t seem that Jones accepts Tropes in *Elements of Logic*. She seems to think that “whiteness” applies to “every case of occurrence,” including “snow, sea-foam, privet-blossom, etc.” (§2, p. 11). If the whiteness of some snow, the whiteness of some sea foam, and the whiteness of the blossom of a privet hedge are numerically identical, then that shared whiteness isn’t a trope.⁵¹ (It seems that an existence attribute shared by many things—for example, physical existence or generic

⁴⁷ Jones and Stout were both students of James Ward. (See Jones 1922: 53–54, van der Schaar 2013: 4.) Stout (1911) wrote the preface to Jones’s (1911a) *A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings*. Jones (1922: 72) described him as having “approved and befriended” her project. Stout (1922) later wrote her obituary in *Mind*.

⁴⁸ On Stout’s (1921: 1, 5) view, there are universals, but they’re classes or kinds of tropes (or particular characters). See van der Schaar 2004, 2013: 128–148; MacBride 2014.

⁴⁹ Examples (10) and (11) come from Jevons 1879: 37–38.

⁵⁰ Jones 1893b: 451. See also Jones 1911a: 40–41.

⁵¹ Jones allows that in (i) “This whiteness is death-like,” “this whiteness” doesn’t name an attribute shared by all white things or even all things exactly similar in color. She says, “an exactly similar colour on china or on silk, etc., need not be death-like” (§3, p. 19). Still, she takes “this whiteness” in (i) to mean “this pallor of countenance,” which might name an attribute shared by several things (§3, p. 19).

existence—wouldn't be a trope either.) And, if Jones doesn't accept Tropes in *Elements of Logic*, then it's not a commitment to Existence and Tropes that leads her to accept Universality of Unique Existence there.

7.3 The path from haecceities

Another path that leads to Universality of Unique Existence starts from claims about *haecceities*.⁵² A haecceity (or “thisness”) is an attribute like *being identical with George Eliot* or *being George Eliot*.⁵³ No two things have the same haecceity. For example, if George Eliot and Shakespeare have haecceities, then their haecceities are distinct.

Universality of Unique Existence is a consequence of the following two claims.

Haecceity: Each thing has a haecceity.

Existence Attributes: Haecceities are existence attributes.

By Haecceity, George Eliot has a haecceity, *h*. By Existence Attributes, *h* is an existence attribute. Since no two things have the same haecceity, nothing else has *h*. So there's an existence attribute—namely, *h*—that only George Eliot has. Generalizing from George Eliot, it follows that for each thing there's an existence attribute—namely, its haecceity—that only it has, in which case Universality of Unique Existence is true.

Kris McDaniel (2017) is an ontological pluralist who might be sympathetic to Universality of Unique Existence. On his view, all sorts of things, including donuts and holes, have haecceities.⁵⁴ So he might be willing to accept Haecceity. And he says that he is “open to the view that a haecceity just is a mode of being that, as a matter of necessity, is enjoyed by exactly one thing.”⁵⁵ If modes of being are existence attributes, then he might be willing to accept Existence Attributes.⁵⁶ And Universality of Unique Existence follows from Haecceity and Existence Attributes.

Although McDaniel doesn't explicitly discuss Universality of Unique Existence, he does discuss something like the following view.⁵⁷

Fundamental Personal Fragmentationalism: Each person has a fundamental existence attribute that no one else has.

⁵² Thanks to Sam Cowling, Kris McDaniel, David Sanson, and faculty at Fort Hays State for discussion of haecceities and Universality of Unique Existence.

⁵³ See, for example, Adams 1979.

⁵⁴ McDaniel 2017: 189.

⁵⁵ McDaniel 2017: 188.

⁵⁶ On McDaniel's (2017: 13) view, modes of being are kinds of existence. And, at least for expository purposes, he sometimes assumes that kinds of existence are attributes (or properties). See McDaniel 2017: 55–56.

⁵⁷ The view that McDaniel (2017: 193–194) discusses is about kinds of existence (or modes of being) rather than existence attributes. McDaniel calls the view “individualistic fragmentationalism.” But I use “individual” to apply to all subjects of attributes, not just persons. See Section 7.1.

Fundamental Personal Fragmentationalism is a consequence of Existence Attributes and the following claim.

Fundamental Personal Haecceity: Each person has a fundamental haecceity.

Fundamental Personal Fragmentationalism and Fundamental Personal Haecceity are Universality of Unique Existence and Haecceity restricted to persons, together with the claim that the existence attributes in question are fundamental.⁵⁸

If what distinguishes persons from other things is that persons have fundamental haecceities whereas other things have non-fundamental haecceities (rather than that person have haecceities whereas other things don't), then Fundamental Personal Haecceity is consistent with Haecceity. In that case, accepting Fundamental Personal Fragmentationalism on the basis of Fundamental Personal Haecceity and Existence Attributes is consistent with accepting Universality of Unique Existence on the basis of Haecceity and Existence Attributes.

7.4 Jones on haecceities

The medieval term “haecceity” (*haecceitas*) was reintroduced by Robert Adams (1979: 6–7). Jones doesn't use “haecceity” or “thisness.” But, in *Elements of Logic*, she does use “That-ness.” She considers (but decides against) using “That-ness” instead of “quantitiveness” to apply to an existence attribute. Speaking of “quantitiveness” and “qualitiveness,” she says,

These words seem to me convenient because they mark both a distinction from and a likeness to ‘Quantity’ and ‘Quality’ as ordinarily used, and they are preferable to ‘That-ness’ and ‘What-ness’ (which are more unequivocal in meaning), because they have corresponding adjectives and adverbs. (§2, p. 6)

As discussed in Section 5, Jones sometimes seems to use “quantitiveness” to apply to unique existence, in which case she might be considering using “That-ness” to apply to unique existence, too.

Jones uses “That-ness” to apply to an existence attribute later in *Elements of Logic*, but it seems that she isn't using it to apply to unique existence. Arguing that every term applies to something that has some existence attribute, she says, “It is but the barest minimum of ‘existence’ of any kind whatever—mere That-ness—that I contend for (no other more determinate existence *could* be involved in the use of *all* terms)” (§11, p. 88). If being “involved in the use of *all* terms” means that “mere That-ness” is an existence attribute shared by everything that any term applies to, then “mere That-ness” isn't unique existence, since different things that different

⁵⁸ On the notion of fundamentality at issue here, see McDaniel 2017: 27–31.

terms apply to don't have the same unique existence. (But "mere That-ness" could be generic existence, which might be what Jones has in mind when she talks about "the barest minimum of 'existence' of any kind whatever."⁵⁹)

Jones might still be sympathetic to Haecceity and Existence Attributes. A haecceity is an attribute that has to do with the identity of the thing that has it.⁶⁰ For example, George Eliot's haecceity might be the attribute *being identical with George Eliot*. And Jones might sometimes be thinking of a thing's unique existence as having to do with its identity. In a passage discussed in Section 5, she describes an existence attribute, perhaps unique existence, as "that identity which enables us to speak of a thing as *one*, under whatever change of attributes" (§2, p. 9). And she talks about the "continued identical existence" of several things (§2, p. 8; §6, p. 47).⁶¹ In the case where several things are one, its "continued identical existence"—perhaps what she later calls the "*individual or continuous existence of one thing* (that is, *individual identity ...*)"—might be its unique existence.⁶²

But, as far as I know, Jones isn't independently committed to Haecceity and Existence Attributes, in which case it isn't a commitment to those claims that leads her to accept Universality of Unique Existence.

8 Conclusion

On Jones's view in *Elements of Logic*, each thing has a unique existence, which it doesn't share with anything else. This is Universality of Unique Existence.

Jones might accept Universality of Unique Existence on the basis of the claims that (i) each thing has quantitiveness (Quantitiveness) and (ii) a thing's quantitiveness is its unique existence (Quantitiveness is Unique Existence). She accepts Quantitiveness. And, although the textual evidence is equivocal, there's some reason (based in part on what she says about "quantitative identity") to think that she accepts Quantitiveness is Unique Existence as well.

Jones might also accept Universality of Unique Existence on the basis of the claims that (iii), for each thing, there's a name that applies uniquely to it (Name)

⁵⁹ After *Elements of Logic*, Jones uses "That-ness" (or "Thatness" or "thatness"), but she doesn't seem to use it to apply to a haecceity or a unique existence. Sometimes she uses it to apply to the denotation or extension of a name. (See Jones 1911b: 53, 1914–1915: 360.) Sometimes she uses it to apply to a thing or its generic existence, which she describes as "existence (in the widest sense—mere thing-hood)." (See Jones 1911a: 9–10. She also suggests using "Quiddity" in the place of "Thatness" thus understood. See Jones 1911a: 14.) In one place she suggests that "That-ness" applies to existence "in some region." (See Jones 1910: 382.) But there's no reason to think that the existence in question is unique existence.

⁶⁰ See, for example, Adams 1979: 6.

⁶¹ Jones talks about pluralities and the existence attributes that they have (e.g. §2, p. 8; §6, p. 47). Cantorian paradox lurks if (i), for any things, there's an existence attribute had by all and only those things and (ii) attributes are things. (See, for example, Florio and Linnebo 2021: Chapter 3.) I hope to say more about Jones on the existence of pluralities elsewhere.

⁶² Jones 1900–1901: 169. See also §27, p. 199.

and (iv) the denomination of a name that applies uniquely to a thing is that thing's unique existence (Denomination is Unique Existence). She might accept Name, and there's some reason (based on what she says about categorical sentences and the relation between denomination and application) to think that she accepts Denomination is Unique Existence as well.

In either case, Universality of Unique Existence is an original view, one that's part of Jones's contributions to the metaphysics of existence and that fits within her more general views in *Elements of Logic* about the quantitativeness of things and the denomination of names.

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