BRILL
RODOPI

GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 94 (2017) 69-82

Grazer Philosophische Studien
brill.com/gps

Counting Again

David Sanson
Illinois State University
dsanson@gmail.com

Ben Caplan
University of Kansas
caplan.16@gmail.com

Cathleen Muller
Marist College
cathleen.muller@marist.edu

Abstract

The authors consider a recurring objection to fictional realism, the view that (broadly speaking) fictional characters are objects. The authors call this the *counting objection*. Russell presses a version of the objection against Meinong's view. Everett presses a version of the objection against contemporary fictional realist views, as (in effect) do Nolan and Sandgren. As the authors see it, the objection assumes that the fictional realist must provide criteria of identity for fictional characters, so its force depends on the plausibility of that assumption. Rather than coming up with such criteria, a fictional realist might argue that the demand is misplaced.

Keywords

fictional characters – counting – identity – Russell – Meinong – Kripke

1 Introduction

W.V.O. Quine once asked Saul Kripke to provide criteria of identity for fictional characters. Kripke (1974, 510) replied,

 | DOI 10.1163/18756735-000017

> Now, of course, exact necessary and sufficient conditions might even be impossible to give. [...] except in the case of mathematics one doesn't really expect exact criteria. One can't really give such a criterion for gross material objects anyway. We don't really have an exact criterion for one and the same television set.

Later, in reference to these remarks, Kripke (2013, 77, n. 17) said,

> Usually the answer to identity questions between fictional (or mythological) characters is obvious. Of course Hamlet is not Macbeth, etc. As to the idea in much philosophical literature that there is a basic demand for a "criterion of identity" for a type of object before it can be discussed intelligibly, I reject this idea and do not think that an intelligible account of it as a general demand about all kinds of entities can be given.

We agree with Kripke about this, both in general and in this particular case: the intelligibility of the view that fictional characters are objects does not depend upon the possibility of providing "exact criteria" of identity for such objects.

But there are fictional realists and then there are fictional realists. Fictional realism in the broad sense is the view that fictional characters are objects, a view that is consistent with a wide range of further views about their nature and ontological status: for Noneists and Meinongians, they are nonexistent concrete actualia; for possibilists, they are existent concrete possibilia; for abstract realists, they are existent abstract actualia.[1] Within each of these categories, there are further subdivisions and disagreements about what sort of thing a fictional character is.

So perhaps it depends: even if the general demand for criteria of identity is rejected, it might be appropriate for certain kinds of objects. As Kripke suggests, we might expect such criteria for mathematical entities. Relatedly, we might expect such criteria for theoretical entities defined by abstraction, even if we don't expect them for televisions and tables.

With this in mind, we would like to consider a recurring objection to fictional realism—we will call it the *counting objection*. Bertrand Russell (1905b) presses a version of the counting objection against Alexius Meinong's (1904) view. Anthony Everett (2005) presses a version of the counting objection against contemporary fictional realist views, as do Daniel Nolan and Alexander

1 See, for example, Sainsbury 2009, 23.

Sandgren (2014).[2] As we see it, this objection assumes that the fictional realist must provide criteria of identity for fictional characters, so its force depends on the plausibility of that assumption.

In Section 2, we discuss Russell's counting objection to Meinong's view. In Section 3, we discuss Everett's counting objection, as well as Nolan and Sandgren's, to contemporary fictional realist views. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss the prospects for counting without criteria of identity or other exact metaphysical principles that might be of help.

2 Russell and Meinong

The counting objection is often confused with, or ignored in favor of, its more famous cousin, the contradiction objection. So, before getting to the counting objection, let's start with the more famous contradiction objection.

In "On Denoting", Russell argues that Meinong's view leads to contradiction. Speaking of the objects posited by Meinong's view, Russell (1905a, 483) says

> the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.

Russell's objection trades on the following principle, which Meinong seems to have endorsed.

> *Unrestricted Characterization:* For any set of properties, some object has all and only those properties.

By Unrestricted Characterization, there is an object that has all and only the properties in the set {*being existent*, *being a present king of France*}. But France is not a monarchy, so this object—the existent present King of France—does not exist. Contradiction.

2 Nolan and Sandgren present their objection specifically as an objection to creationism (fictional realism together with the view that fictional characters are created by authors), but their objection probably applies just as well to discoverism about fictional characters. Thanks to Brandon Sadowsky here.

If they wish to avoid this contradiction, Meinongians must reject Unrestricted Characterization, and this is what many Meinongians do. Terence Parsons (1980, 22–27, 74–75), for example, distinguishes between *nuclear* properties, like *being a king*, and *extranuclear* properties, like *being existent*, and replaces Unrestricted Characterization with the following principle.

> *Restricted Characterization:* "For any set of nuclear properties, some object has all the properties in that set and no other nuclear properties" (Parsons 1980, 19).

Restricted Characterization tells us that the present king of France has the nuclear property *being a king of France* (and only that nuclear property). But it tells us nothing about his existence, since existence is an extranuclear property and hence is not determined by the principle. So the contradiction is avoided, and Russell's "chief objection"—the contradiction objection—is disarmed.

In a review published in the same issue as "On Denoting", Russell (1905b, 533) also argues that Meinong's view leads to a counting problem:

> If "A differs from B" and "A does not differ from B" are to be both true, we cannot tell, for example, whether a class composed of A and B has one member or two. Thus in all counting, if our results are to be definite, we must first exclude impossible objects. We cannot, if B is impossible, say "A and B are two objects"; nor can we strictly say "B is one object".

At first glance, this might appear to be just another variant of the contradiction objection. By Unrestricted Characterization, some object, *A*, has all and only the properties in the set {*being identical with B, being distinct from B*}, and some object, *B*, has all and only the properties in the set {*being identical with A*, *being distinct from A*}. It follows that *A* and *B* are identical, hence one, but also distinct, hence two. So once again we have a contradiction.

As before, the Meinongian can avoid contradiction by rejecting Unrestricted Characterization. For example, following Parsons (1980, 28), she can adopt Restricted Characterization and classify identity properties—properties like *being identical to B* and *being distinct from B*—as extranuclear.[3]

But now for the counting objection. Absent some principle like Unrestricted Characterization, we have no principled way of settling whether *A* and *B* are

3 See also Caplan and Muller 2015, 176.

one or two.[4] But that cannot be right: if *A* and *B* are objects, there must be a definite fact of the matter as to how many members {*A*, *B*} has.[5]

Parsons (1980, 19) avoids this counting objection by defending a separate principle that settles the question of how many objects *A* and *B* are.

> *Parsons's Principle:* "No two objects (real or unreal) have exactly the same nuclear properties".[6]

Since the characterizations of *A* and *B* include no nuclear properties, they have exactly the same nuclear properties; so, by Parsons's Principle, they are identical.

Parsons's Principle provides a criterion of identity for all objects. In fact, it is just a version of the granddaddy of all criteria of identity, the Identity of Indiscernibles. This should not be a surprise. The counting objection in effect assumes that there must be a principled way of settling how many objects there are, given what (nuclear) properties those objects have, and something like the Identity of Indiscernibles is a natural candidate for such a principle.

But this should also give you pause. If you are antecedently inclined to reject the Identity of Indiscernibles for televisions and tables, presumably you are also antecedently inclined to reject the demand for a principled way of settling how many televisions or tables there are, given what (nuclear) properties those televisions and tables have.

This then suggests a second way to resist the counting objection: rather than coming up with a principle that settles the question, argue that the demand for such principles in application to the objects in question is misplaced, much as it would be misplaced in application to televisions or tables. We consider the prospects for this response in more detail in Section 4. But, first, we look at the counting objection as it arises in the recent literature on fictional realism.

3 Everett, and Nolan and Sandgren

In "Against Fictional Realism", Everett (2005, 633–638) argues that fictional realism entails that some fictional characters are "logically incoherent".[7] Everett (2005, 633–634) tells the following story.

4 For a similar reading, see Griffin 1985–1986, 395–398.

5 Compare Quine's (1948, 4) famous comments about Wyman's "slum of possibles".

6 Italics removed.

7 See also Everett 2013, 213–214.

> *Dialethialand*: When she arrived in Dialethialand, Jane met Jules and Jim. This confused Jane since Jules and Jim both were, and were not, distinct people. And this made it hard to know how to interact with them. For example, since Jules both was and was not Jim, if Jim came to tea Jules both would and wouldn't come too. This made it hard for Jane to determine how many biscuits to serve. Then Jane realized what to do. She needed both to buy and not to buy extra biscuits whenever Jim came. After that everything was better.

According to *Dialethialand*, Jules both is and isn't identical with Jim. From this, Everett (2005, 637) concludes that fictional realism entails that Jules both is and isn't identical with Jim outside of the fiction. So we have a contradiction.[8]

This is the contradiction objection. But, as before, the contradiction objection leads into the counting objection.

Everett's objection depends on a bridge principle—a principle that allows us to infer something about the fictional characters outside of the fiction based solely on what is true of them according to the fiction. But abstract realists reject broad bridge principles: according to the stories, Sherlock Holmes is a human detective who smokes a pipe; but in reality, abstract realists maintain, Holmes is an abstract object, neither human nor detective nor capable of smoking a pipe. So Everett's bridge principle is narrowly tailored to questions of identity.

The bridge principle that Everett's objection depends on is roughly this.

> *Identity Exportation:* For any set of identity properties, if a fictional character has all those identity properties according to a fiction, then it has those identity properties outside of the fiction.[9]

Here, identity properties include both positive properties, like *being identical with Jim*, and negative properties, like *not being identical with Jim*.

Why should fictional realists believe in Identity Exportation? Presumably because, if they were to reject it and hence avoid the contradiction, they would have no principled way of settling whether Jules and Jim are one or two and hence would face the counting objection. (It's true that, with Identity Exportation, fictional realists get a contradiction; but that's a different problem.

8 See also Everett 2013, 190–194, 225–230. For some replies, see Milne 2013, Schnieder and von Solodkoff 2009, Thomasson 2011, and Voltolini 2010.

9 For more careful statements of the relevant bridge principle, see Everett 2005, 627; 2013, 205. We have suppressed some niceties for ease of exposition.

With Identity Exportation, there is an answer to the question "Are Jules and Jim one or two?" It's just that the answer is "Yes, both!")

In "Counting and Cardinality", Nolan and Sandgren (2014) argue that, given a fictional realist view, there is no consistent way to count how many fictional objects there are. Nolan and Sandgren (2014, 618) tell the following story.

> In one of the greatest reverses in mathematical history, Lucia's arguments were in the end conclusive. Naive set theory was true after all. Mathematicians everywhere were amazed, and while the realization that sets included such strange entities as the set of all sets and the Russell set caused a new burst of interest in the foundations of mathematics, many mathematicians soon realized that their everyday work was substantially unchanged. Lucia herself took a while to get used to the celebrity thrust upon her, but eventually she seemed pleased with how it all turned out. "I thought I'd continue to work in obscurity, and that most set-theorists might not even notice my papers until after I was long gone: I'm lucky to have lived through going from being a mathematical heretic to a mathematical hero".

Call this "Lucia's Story". According to "Lucia's Story", there are exactly n naive sets, and there are exactly 2^n naive sets (for some $n > 0$).[10] From this, Nolan and Sandgren (2014, 619) conclude that a fictional realist view entails that (for some $n > 0$) there are exactly n fictional objects that, according to "Lucia's Story", are naive sets but also that there are exactly 2^n such fictional objects.

Again, the objection depends on a bridge principle. Again, the principle is narrowly tailored. In this case, the principle is tailored to questions of cardinality rather than identity and is roughly this.

> *Cardinality Exportation:* For any proposition P and any fiction F, if P is a cardinality proposition about fictional objects that come from F (and is not about other objects) and P is true according to F, then P is true.[11]

A *cardinality proposition* is a *de re* proposition about the cardinality of some objects—a proposition that says, of some objects, how many they are. Assume,

10 See Nolan and Sandgren 2014, 619.

11 For a more careful statement of the relevant bridge principle, see Nolan and Sandgren 2014, 617. Again, we have suppressed some niceties for ease of exposition, and we have restated the principle to bring out the parallels with Identity Exportation. (For a discussion of some of the niceties, see note 18.)

with Nolan and Sandgren, that there is a number $n > 0$ such that, according to "Lucia's Story", there are exactly n naive sets and also, according to "Lucia's Story", there are exactly 2^n naive sets.[12] Now consider the fictional objects that, according to "Lucia's Story", are these naive sets. Let $S(n)$ be the cardinality proposition that says of these objects that there are exactly n of them, and let $S(2^n)$ be the cardinality proposition that says of these objects that there are exactly 2^n of them. According to "Lucia's Story", both $S(n)$ and $S(2^n)$ are true; so, by Cardinality Exportation, they are both true outside of the fiction. So, outside of the fiction, the number of these objects is exactly n but also exactly 2^n. So we have a contradiction.

Why should fictional realists believe in Cardinality Exportation? Presumably because, if they were to reject it and hence avoid the contradiction, they would have no principled way of settling how many fictional objects there are and hence would face the counting objection. (It's true that, with Cardinality Exportation, fictional realists get a contradiction; but, again, that's a different problem. With Cardinality Exportation, there is an answer to the question "Are there exactly n fictional objects that, in the story, are naive sets or are there exactly 2^n such objects?" It's just that, again, the answer is "Yes, both!")

Some fictional realists might be willing to accept *indeterminate* facts about how many fictional characters there are.[13] But, as far as we know, few if any fictional realists are willing to accept *contradictory* facts about how many fictional characters there are.[14] Instead, most fictional realists reject bridge principles like Identity Exportation and Cardinality Exportation and defend alternative principles that, in any given case, settle (in a determinate and non-contradictory way) how many fictional characters there are.[15] But we reject the demand for such principles: as we see it, if there are any fictional characters, then the number of fictional characters there are will be a brute and unprincipled fact.[16]

---

12 If you don't like that assumption (either because "Lucia's Story" doesn't specify what n is or because Cantor's proof might not hold in the story), we could build more into the story. See Nolan and Sandgren 2014, 619.

13 See Thomasson 1999, 69; Thomasson 2011, 142; Parsons 2011, 40. On indeterminate facts about how many non-fictional objects there are, see Parsons 2000, 134–149; Thomasson 2007, 104–107.

14 Priest (2002, 2005) might be an exception.

15 Schnieder and von Solodkoff (2009, 143, 148) and Thomasson (2011, 139–140) suggest principles along these lines. (But Thomasson's preferred response is to accept that there are indeterminate facts about how many fictional characters there are. See note 13.)

16 We are grateful to a still-anonymous audience member at Wayne State who suggested something like this view during a Q&A. See also Caplan and Muller 2015.

Consider what Nolan and Sandgren (2014, 616, 617) say to motivate the demand for a principle like Cardinality Exportation:

> We should be able to formulate a *bridge principle* that will capture the relationship that, according to the creationist [or, more generally, fictional realist], holds between what objects exist according to the fiction and which fictional objects genuinely exist. (Italics in original)
>
> There should be some principle like this endorsed by a creationist [or, more generally, fictional realist] which takes us from claims about which entities exist according to a fiction to claims about which fictional entities in fact exist.

But it is hard to see the appeal of bridge principles, even bridge principles that are narrowly tailored to questions of cardinality—principles that, as Nolan and Sandgren put it, take us to "claims about which fictional entities in fact exist" solely from "claims about which entities exist according to a fiction"—for abstract realists, who hold that fictional characters are abstract objects that exist outside of the fictions. Such objects will generally have significant non-fictional properties that do not derive from what is true of them according to the fiction—properties like *being created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle* and *first appearing in print in 1887*. Why would it be appropriate to demand that the question of how many fictional characters there are be determined *only* by what is true of them according to the fiction, not taking into account these significant non-fictional properties as well?[17]

But there is a weaker way of reading Nolan and Sandgren's demand for a "bridge principle" in these cases. On the weaker reading, what they want is a principle that "takes us from claims about which entities exist according to a fiction" *together with whatever other facts might be relevant, such as facts about whatever non-fictional properties the objects have outside of the fiction*, "to claims about which fictional entities in fact exist."[18] This is a demand that even the abstract realist might find appealing.

17 For some possibly congenial remarks, see Voltolini 2010, 55–56.

18 It might seem that Nolan and Sandgren (2014, 627) are attempting to meet a stronger demand, since the bridge principle that they propose takes us "to claims about which fictional entities in fact exist" from a claim that appears to be solely about what is true according to the fiction: namely, "according to that fiction, there are exactly *n* objects that are neither real non-fictional objects nor originally from another fiction" (italics in original). But, as Nolan and Sandgren (2014, 627) point out, "It is a nice question how to

In a way, we are back where we were before, when considering Russell's objection to Meinong. The demand is to provide a principled way of settling how many fictional characters there are, given some restricted set of information—say, the properties those characters have, either within the fiction or outside of the fiction—that does not already include information about how many fictional characters there are. But when, if ever, are such demands appropriate?

4 Counting without Principles

We are inclined to say that there is a (determinate, non-contradictory) fact of the matter about how many televisions and tables there are and, for any given televisions or tables, a (determinate, non-contradictory) fact of the matter about whether they are the same or distinct. But we doubt that there is a principled way of settling exactly how many televisions and tables there are, given some restricted set of information about what those televisions and tables are like. That is, we don't think that, in the case of televisions and tables, facts about numerical identity and cardinality can be explained by appealing to other, more basic facts.

Indeed, this seems to us to be a good candidate mark for basic objecthood. Suppose someone suggests that we count televisions or tables by counting hunks of matter: table *A* is distinct from table *B* just in case *A* and *B* are composed of distinct hunks of matter. To us, this suggests the view that the hunks of matter, not the tables, are the basic objects. If they go on to suggest that the hunks are to be counted by looking at the spatiotemporal connectedness and disconnectedness of the distinct point-sized atoms that make up the hunks, then that suggests that it is the atoms, not the hunks, that are the basic objects. If the distinctness of those atoms is explained by appeal to the distinctness of the spacetime points they occupy, then that suggests that it is the points, not the atoms, that are the basic objects. It is only when this sort of explanation bottoms out and we are left with some (determinate, non-contradictory) number of distinct entities, but no principled explanation of why they are distinct or why that is their number, that we have reached the basic objects.

A demand for principled ways of settling the number of fictional characters *could* be driven by the assumption that such objects are not basic objects. Abstract realists say that fictional characters are abstract objects. For some,

---

say that the *n* objects are not real or from another fiction" (italics in original); and it might well be that the right way to say that takes us beyond what is true according to the fiction. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to consider the alternative reading of the demand for bridge principles.

this means, not just that they are not concrete, but that they are *abstractions*, generated (in some sense) by principles of abstraction that determine their number and identity.[19] Edward Zalta's (1983) work might be taken to be a case in point. He provides an axiomatic theory of objects, and his axioms include principles that determine the number and identity of abstract objects.[20] Kripke suggests that we should expect such exact principles only in the mathematical case; Zalta's theory, in effect, can be taken as treating all abstract objects on this quasi-mathematical model.

But many abstract realists reject this picture and think of fictional characters as abstract artifacts, more analogous to televisions and tables than numbers or sets.[21] But, so understood, there is no reason to expect them to be governed by exact principles that would satisfy those who seek criteria of identity of the sort that would settle all counting problems.

There still might be relevant principles at play (or there might not). Perhaps it is a general principle that there cannot be indeterminate, or contradictory, facts about how many objects there are. Note that no such principle entails any specific cardinality proposition, and none is a good candidate for satisfying demands for criteria of identity: such principles serve only to rule out a range of problematic cardinality propositions; they fail to settle which of the non-problematic propositions are true. Beyond that, however, we don't think that there are likely to be precise metaphysical principles at work about fictional characters (if there are any); and the same goes for televisions and tables.

Assuming that there are fictional characters, the answer to various cardinality questions about them might seem obvious in certain cases. As Kripke (2013, 77 n. 17) puts it, "Of course Hamlet is not Macbeth." In addition, there might be vague principles of a sort that lead us to conclude that Hamlet is not Macbeth. After all, it seems that Hamlet appears in one play and Macbeth appears in another; and perhaps, when it seems that one fictional character appears in one play and another fictional character appears in another, those fictional characters are likely to really be distinct. But vague principles of this sort, we think, are heuristic at best. They are fallible epistemic guides, not metaphysical routes to the truth; and, as such, they are far removed from the sorts of exact principles that those who seek criteria of identity for fictional characters are after.

19 Harry Deutsch emphasized this point to us in conversation.

20 See, for example, Zalta 1983, 32–37, 73–76.

21 For an interpretation of Zalta's theory on which the abstract objects that it posits are contingently existing artifacts, see Zalta 2000, 138–144. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this interpretation of Zalta's theory.

A theory of fictional characters need not foreclose certain skeptical possibilities. Perhaps one fictional character might appear in two plays, being described as a Danish prince called 'Hamlet' in *The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark* and as a Scottish king called 'Macbeth' in *The Tragedy of Macbeth*. Or perhaps one fictional character might appear in *Hamlet* several times over, as it were, being described both as a Danish prince called 'Hamlet' and as a ghost of a Danish king also called 'Hamlet', or even as a woman called 'Ophelia'. This is the sort of skeptical scenario that Kit Fine (1982, 135) describes when he says, "It may be, for example, that a story with the same content as the Sherlock Holmes story should be about a single extraordinary individual with the combined properties of both Holmes and Watson." (On Fine's (1982, 135) view, however, extra-fictional considerations, such as authorial intentions, might settle the question of whether Holmes and Watson are one or two; on our view, this need not be so.)

In this respect, the view we are suggesting that fictional realists should adopt is robustly realist: on this view, fictional characters are not just theoretical posits (any more than televisions are), and not all facts about fictional characters must flow from a theory of fictional characters. Instead, according to the view, they are real objects that play a role in our theory, and the facts about them—for present purposes, most saliently, the facts about their number and existence—transcend the entailments of our theory. This is our attitude towards televisions and tables, and it is also how we think the fictional realist should think about fictional characters.

Recall Kripke's (2013, 77, n. 17) comment, that we don't need "exact criteria" of identity before fictional characters can be "discussed intelligibly". If talk of fictional characters was mere reification of fictional discourse, then Kripke's point would have to be tempered: the limits of intelligible discussion would be set by the limits of the discourse; and, if that discourse offered no criteria of identity, at that point the reification would give out. But, if talk of fictional characters is instead talk of a genuine domain of objects, then not all metaphysical facts about those objects will be determined by principles. As a result, a theory of fictional characters needn't always be of help to us when it comes to counting them.

The situation for the realist about fictional characters strikes us as no different in this respect than the situation for the realist about televisions and tables. Assuming that there are tables, the answer to various cardinality questions about them might seem obvious in certain cases. Of course the table that appears to be on this side of the room is not the table that appears to be on that side of the room; and there might be vague principles of a sort that lead us to conclude that the table that appears to be over here is not the table that

appears to be over there. After all, it seems that one table appears in one place and the other table appears in another place; and perhaps, when it seems that one table appears in one place and another table appears in another, those tables are likely to really be distinct.

But, again, vague principles of this sort are heuristic at best. Perhaps, although it seems that there are two tables, there is really one multi-located time-travelling table, and it *is* in two places at once, both here and there. Or perhaps both tables are merely manifestations of the same underlying One True Substance and so, in a deep metaphysical sense, are really "the same". The point is that we don't need exact criteria of identity to rule out these sorts of cases before we can talk intelligibly about televisions and tables; and, as a result, a theory of televisions or tables needn't always be of help to us when it comes to counting them. Why demand more of a theory of fictional characters?

Acknowledgements

Thanks to several anonymous referees for comments. For discussion, thanks to students at Ohio State and Umeå University; to participants at talks at the Inter-University Center in Dubrovnik, l'Université de Montréal, Wayne State, and Western Michigan; and to David Braun, Scott Brown, Sam Cowling, Wesley Cray, Salvatore Florio, Terry Parsons, Brandon Sadowsky, Giorgio Sbardolini, and Evan Woods.

References

Caplan, Ben and Muller, Cathleen 2015: "Brutal Identity". In: Stuart Brock and Anthony Everett (eds.), *Fictional Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 174–207.

Everett, Anthony 2005: "Against Fictional Realism". *Journal of Philosophy* 102, 624–649.

Everett, Anthony 2013: *The Nonexistent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fine, Kit 1982: "The Problem of Non-Existents: 1. Internalism". *Topoi* 1, 97–140.

Griffin, Nicholas 1985–1986: "Russell's Critique of Meinong's Theory of Objects". *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 25–26, 375–401.

Kripke, Saul A. et al. 1974: "Second General Discussion Session". *Synthese* 27, 509–521.

Kripke, Saul A. 2013: *Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meinong, Alexius 1904: "Über Gegenstandstheorie". In: Alexius Meinong (ed.), *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*. Leipzig: Barth, 1–51. Translated by Isaac Levi, D.B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm as "The Theory of Objects" in:

Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, edited by Roderick M. Chisholm, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 76–117.

Milne, Daniel Alexander 2013: "Everett's Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness". *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 88, 33–54.

Nolan, Daniel and Sandgren, Alexander 2014: "Counting and Cardinality". *Analysis* 74, 615–622.

Parsons, Terence 1980: *Nonexistent Objects*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Parsons, Terence 2000: *Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parsons, Terence 2011: "Fictional Characters and Indeterminate Identity". In: Franck Lihoreau (ed.), *Truth in Fiction*. Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 27–42.

Priest, Graham 2002: *Beyond the Limits of Thought*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.

Priest, Graham 2005: *Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Quine, Willard Van Orman 1948: "On What There Is". *Review of Metaphysics* 2, 21–38. Reprinted in: Willard Van Orman Quine, *From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953, 1–19.

Russell, Bertrand 1905a: "On Denoting". *Mind* 14, 479–493.

Russell, Bertrand 1905b: Review of: Alexius Meinong (ed.), *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, *Mind* 14, 530–538.

Sainsbury, Richard M. 2009: *Fiction and Fictionalism*. New York: Routledge.

Schnieder, Benjamin and von Solodkoff, Tatjana 2009: "In Defence of Fictional Realism". *Philosophical Quarterly* 59, 138–149.

Thomasson, Amie L. 1999: *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomasson, Amie L. 2007: *Ordinary Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomasson, Amie L. 2011: "Fiction, Existence and Indeterminacy". In: John Woods (ed.), *Fictions and Models: New Essays*. Munich: Philosophia, 109–148.

Voltolini, Alberto 2010: "Against Against Fictional Realism". *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 80, 47–63.

Zalta, Edward N. 1983: *Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Zalta, Edward N. 2000: "The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory". In: Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.), *Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence*. Stanford: CSLI, 117–147.