

**Advanced Philosophy of Language (Philosophy 673)**  
Winter 2010

***General information***

Instructor: Ben Caplan  
Time: M W 12:30 PM – 2:18 PM

***Description***

Since 1892, philosophers have been well aware that substituting one coreferential name for another in a *simple sentence* can sometimes seem to affect *cognitive value* (e.g. 'Clark Kent = Clark Kent' seems trivial, whereas 'Clark Kent = Superman' seems informative) and that substituting one coreferential name for another in a *propositional-attitude ascription* can sometimes seem to affect *truth-value* (e.g. 'Lex believes that Clark Kent = Clark Kent' seems true, whereas 'Lex believes that Clark Kent = Superman' seems false). More recently, however, philosophers have started to pay attention to cases in which it seems that substituting one coreferential name for another in a *simple sentence* can affect *truth-value* (e.g. 'Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out' might seem true, whereas 'Superman went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out' might seem false). We will look at Fregean and Millian theories of names and what they have to say about these apparent substitutivity failures. We will read Jennifer Saul's 2007 book, *Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions*.